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Executive Summary
Recent discussions of global agro-food systems 
have turned the spotlight on food retailing. Ob­
servers concur that globalization has been accom­
panied by, and may have aided, retail concentration 
in agro-food markets. This transformation, espe­
cially in developing countries, has been nothing 
short of a revolution.
Until now, India has been conspicuous as an excep­
tion to the rule. Only around 2 percent of all retail 
trade in India is in the organized sector. The food 
retail sector is likely even more fragmented and 
continues to be a complex mosaic of diverse small- 
scale actors, including itinerant vendors, govern­
ment outlets, cooperative markets, and small-scale 
corner stores.
This fragmented retail sector was attributable in 
large part to the policy framework. So far, foreign 
direct investment [FDI], a critical driver of retail 
transformation in other countries, has been dis­
allowed in the retail sector. Laws putting ceilings 
on urban land use limit the physical space available 
to giant retail stores. In addition, domestic trade in 
agricultural produce was tightly regulated. Post­
harvest practices related to storage and transporta­
tion, as well as logistical bottlenecks, have also 
stood in the way of large-scale investments in the 
sector. Yet these factors might be changing now. 
Growing urban consumerism and the rise of a 
newly wealthy professional middle class that values 
shopping experience and convenience have spurred 
a growth in demand for processed and branded 
ready-to-eat convenience foods. In the absence of 
FDI, domestic businesses have responded power­
fully to this demand and intensified their focus on 
food retailing. Meanwhile, with India ranked the 
top destination for global retail investment for the 
second consecutive year, multinationals are seeking 
ways, other than FDI, to enter the Indian market.
Advocates enthuse, rightly, over the efficiencies 
that large-scale investments would bring. At the 
same time, there is considerable concern that the 
emergence of supermarkets, especially if it leads to 
retail concentration, might have distressing implica­
tions for a large constituency of poor actors along 
the entire chain—small and poor farmers, informal 
traders, and retailers, as well as poorer consumers. 
Retail transformation raises important questions 
about the relative position of farmers in the supply
chain. Although consumers are the presumed bene­
ficiaries of supermarkets, because of improvements 
in quality, safety, and choice, it is not clear if 
supermarkets will be able to serve the poorer seg­
ments of the population. As for small traders, the 
emergence of large-scale retailers with deep pockets 
could dismantle their livelihoods if they succeed in 
weaning away small traders' clientele. In short, it is 
not clear if supermarkets will be part of a solution 
to poverty or part of the problem.
Clearly, two issues merit careful scrutiny. First, how 
will the efficiency gains from this transformation be 
distributed across actors? Second, what is the 
nature of costs associated with the displacement of 
livelihoods that such a transformation would entail? 
Given these considerations, should the government 
enable or aid such a transformation by recon­
figuring domestic policies and opening up FDI in 
retailing?
Your assignment is to recommend to the Govern­
ment of India a set of policies to be pursued to 
guide future developments in the food retail sector, 




Recent discussion of global agro-food systems has 
turned the spotlight on food retailing, and with 
good reason. There is widespread agreement today 
that across the developing world, retail sector 
transformation is spearheading fundamental 
changes in food systems and that these changes 
have happened with stunning rapidity, often within 
the span of a decade.
Consider this. In the 1980s there were few large- 
scale food retailers and almost no supermarkets1 *in
1 There is no universally accepted definition of a super­
market, and definitions probably vary across countries. It 
is typically defined based on store space [ 3 0 0 ^ ,0 0 0  
square meters], number of checkout counters [more than
three or four], and/or sales volume, in the United States, 
for instance, any full-line self-service grocery store 
generating a sales volume of US$2 million or more 
annually might be called a supermarket. For the purpose
most developing countries. By 2002, supermarkets 
claimed close to two-thirds of the share of food 
sales in parts of Latin America; more than half in 
East and Southeast Asia, Central Europe, and South 
Africa; and almost a fifth in countries such as 
China. In fact, in China food retailing was com­
pletely controlled by the government until 1990, 
and there were no supermarkets. By 2003, super­
markets accounted for 30 percent of the urban 
food market share, and their sales revenue is 
growing at 3 0 -40  percent a year—faster than in 
most other developing countries [Hu et al. 2004], 
Some Latin American countries offer similarly dra­
matic examples. In Argentina, supermarkets' share 
of retail food sales was 60 percent by 2003; in 
Brazil, 75 percent. These figures are close to the 
75-80 percent share in the United States and 
France. Remarkably, what took five decades to hap­
pen in the United States has taken a mere decade in 
these countries [Reardon 2006],
It is interesting too that this transformation of the 
agro-food marketing chain has come in waves 
across the regions through a spatial diffusion that 
mimics the "flying geese" phenomenon.2 It started 
with the richer countries in Latin America during 
the early 1990s. Next, came East and Southeast 
Asia and Central Europe. The third wave, in the 
late 1990s and after, hit the poorer, smaller coun­
tries of Central America and Southeast Asia, as well 
as Southern and then Eastern Africa. By 2003, the 
share of supermarkets in food retail sales in Taiwan 
and the Czech Republic had reached 55 percent. 
Similarly, in Chile, Costa Rica, the Philippines, South 
Africa, and Thailand, supermarkets were capturing 
half of the food retail market in 2003. The fourth 
wave, which has only just begun, is in the poorer 
countries of South Asia and West Africa.
The idea of such a change is not new. Historical 
experience suggests that as countries develop, 
markets transform from fragmented local markets 
to larger centralized markets. This process typically 
originates in the dry goods sector before
of this case study, supermarket refers to the entire class 
of large-format retailers and includes hypermarkets, 
discount stores, and supermarkets.
2The flying geese paradigm has been applied in several 
contexts. It has been used, for example, to explain the 
catching-up process of "latecomer" economies— in 
particular, of the sequential appearance and development 
of industries in a particular developing country. It is most 
famously associated with Akamatsu [1962],
encompassing fresh produce, including fruits, vege­
tables, and dairy.3 Yet in terms of speed and trans­
formative power, what developing countries are 
experiencing today is nothing short of a revolution. 
In particular, this transformation has taken an 
unfamiliar path because it is grafted onto agrarian 
systems that have often not made the transition to 
"modernized" industrial agriculture. It is also taking 
place in the context of immense poverty and depri­
vation. In 2001 as much as 21 percent of the popu­
lation in developing countries lived in "extreme" 
poverty, on less than US$1 a day [World Bank 
2004], Supermarkets are apparently no longer a 
rich-country phenomenon. There is hence consi­
derable concern that the emergence of super­
markets, especially if it leads to retail concentration, 
might have distressing implications for a large con­
stituency of poor actors along the entire chain, 
from farmer to consumer. In short, it is not clear 
at all if supermarkets will be part of a solution to 
poverty or part of the problem.4
Until now, India, like South Asia itself, did not 
enter these discussions. Untouched by these global 
waves, India was an exception to the rule. Recent 
events, however, suggest that these waves have 
reached Indian shores. Rated in 2006 as the num­
ber one destination for global investment in the 
retail sector—for the second consecutive year5— 
India now finds itself conspicuous on the radar 
screens of investors. Quite independently of global 
retail trends, the agro-food sector has begun to 
attract domestic investments from Indian corporate 
houses on a scale that suggests that this may well 
be a revolution in the making.
This case study takes a critical look at this change. 
While mapping the institutional and policy setting 
of the contemporary agro-food sector in India, this 
study attempts to go beyond the much-publicized 
advantages of this transformation related to effi­
ciency gains along the supply chain and to train a 
lens on its less obvious and possibly more
3 For factors that drive this transformation, see Reardon 
et al. [2003],
4Timmer [forthcoming] takes up this question in some 
detail.
sThis rating comes from A. T. Kearney's Global Retail 
Development Index [A. T. Kearney 2006], This index is 
typically composed of 2 5 -3 0  different variables 
capturing four aspects of retail development: market 
attractiveness, country risk, time pressure, and market 
saturation.
troubling implications. Its scope is seriously limited 
by the paucity of data and systematic research. The 
study is hence necessarily speculative, going only 
so far as to lay out the issues and drawing on 
studies elsewhere as illustrations. Indeed, this paper 
raises more questions than it answers. Yet this lack 
of research itself makes it important to examine 
this phenomenon.
The Retail Mosaic of India: The Story So Far
India has in the past earned the epithet of "lum­
bering elephant" for being slow in just about every­
thing that advocates of globalization care about. 
This is true of the retail sector as well. For some 
years now, India has been conspicuous as an 
outlier.
India's retail sector today continues to be highly 
fragmented. It is a complex mosaic of diverse small- 
scale actors, including itinerant vendors, govern­
ment outlets, cooperative markets, and small-scale 
corner stores, most of which are in the informal 
sector. As recently as 2002, only 2 percent of all 
retail (food and nonfood] trade in India was in the 
organized sector—the figure is put at 5 percent in 
the food sector. Compare this with India's Asian 
neighbors, and the nature of the Indian retail land­
scape becomes clear. The share of the organized 
sector in Malaysia, for instance, is put at 50 
percent; in Thailand, 40 percent; and in the 
Philippines, 35 percent (Sasi 2004],
The Indian retail sector, food and nonfood 
together, employs an estimated 8 percent of the 
work force—the most people after agriculture. 
Estimates also suggest that India has not only the 
highest number of retail outlets in the world (at 12 
million), but also the greatest density of retailers, at 
II per 1,000 people. In terms of size, only 4 percent 
of all retailers operate in spaces larger than 400 
square feet. Consequently, in per capita terms, 
availability of retail space in India is among the 
lowest in the world, at 2 square feet per capita. 
This is in deep contrast with the 19 square feet per 
capita in the United States (KSA Technopak 2005). 
These characteristics are mirrored in the food­
retailing sector, which by all accounts is even more 
fragmented than the nonfood sector. The informal 
segment of the retail sector in India thus comprises 
a large number of small-scale, low-investment 
retailers, each serving a small catchment of 
consumers.
Despite this umbrella category, the informal retail 
sector is actually quite diverse, comprising a wide 
profile of actors. At one end are itinerant vendors 
and handcart vendors, especially for fresh fruits 
and vegetables. They form the last link in a long 
chain of intermediaries. Typically, they procure 
produce in wholesale markets and go door-to-door 
selling these goods. Their margins are often thin, 
and they operate with little capital. Often, these 
vendors have long-term relationships with buyers, 
in some cases even straddling generations.
Vendors also congregate in street vegetable 
markets [plaza markets] or by the roadside. 
Although reminiscent of the farmers' markets of 
the West, these vendors function as pure inter­
mediaries. In both cases, the transaction between 
consumer and vendors is a social relationship 
rather than a purely economic one, something that 
characterizes most traditional modes of exchange. 
It is difficult to say how many such vendors there 
are in the country as a whole, given that there is 
no systematic enumeration.
Then there are the corner stores (called kirana) that 
sell groceries, dry goods, and a limited range of 
nonfood items. An estimated 5 million of them dot 
the retail landscape of India. The majority of food 
and food products are retailed through these 
neighborhood stores, which typically operate in an 
area of 200 square feet and sell 500 to 800 stock 
keeping units [SKUs].6 Like the vendors, they 
usually have a loyal local clientele, many of whom 
buy on credit. Many of these stores offer home 
delivery services within a certain distance.
Alongside these neighborhood stores is a network 
of cooperative stores. Typically these stores are 
owned jointly by producers and state agencies and 
operated and managed by state agencies. Some are 
specifically for vegetables, like the Safal chain in 
Delhi or HOPCOMS in Bangalore.7 *Dairy products
6SKUs are the smallest unit of any product for which 
accounts are kept and counted, in a typical supermarket 
the number of SKUs is on the order of 15,000.
7HOPCOMS, for instance, has a total membership of
11,680 farmers who own 9 percent of the shares. A state 
agency owns 90  percent of the shares, and 1 percent is 
owned by cooperative banks and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). HOPCOMS ran 231 stores in 
Bangalore as of 2 005 ; and Safal, 279 in Delhi. Safal has 
made forays into processing and developing export 
markets.
in particular have always been dominated by outlets 
of producer-cooperatives and operate under the 
aegis of the National Dairy Development Board of 
India. This board engineered a "White Revolution" 
in dairy production under Operation Flood. There 
are also more broad-based grocery and cooperative 
departmental stores [which sell groceries—only dry 
goods—'and household and personal items] run by 
Civil Supplies Departments.8 These entities were 
started with state patronage in the early 1960s at a 
time when shortages of basic goods were common. 
The objective of the Civil Supplies Corporations is 
expressly to provide "Common Man's Needs at 
Affordable Prices." Most are responsible for 
drawing on the state's stock of food staples and 
serve as channels for some government food 
schemes.
There have also been experiments with farmers' 
markets in some cities. The stated objective of 
these initiatives is to sidestep the exploitative terms 
of sale between farmers and traders by enabling 
farmers to sell directly to consumers. Several of 
these markets continue to function and have been 
regarded as successful on many counts. One exam­
ple is the Rythu Bazaars in Andhra Pradesh, which 
were established in 1999.
Since the late 1990s a class of supermarket-style 
food stores has emerged, especially in cities in 
southern India. In contrast with traditional stores, 
these stores stock both dry and wet goods and 
often offer value-added or convenience products 
and ready-to-cook items, like pancake batter and 
cut vegetables. Most often, these supermarket-style 
stores are local businesses that have no or few 
branches and are typically owned by entrepreneurs 
who make medium-scale investments.
Because India is a vast and diverse country, there 
are significant regional and rural-urban differences 
in the particular mix of retail institutions. For 
instance, until recently, cities in the south have had 
more supermarket-style stores than have north 
Indian cities. Similarly, small towns and vast 
stretches of rural India are served predominantly 
by neighborhood stores and vendors.
8 Civil Supplies Departments are designated wings within 
the government that oversee the functioning of the Civil 
Supplies Corporations.
Policy Issues
Why Hus India Been Different?
Given this complex retail mosaic in India, why has 
change, specifically defragmentation, in the retail 
sector been so slow in its coming? Starting with 
broad-based economic reforms in 1991, perhaps 
even earlier, there was a pronounced increase in 
private participation in many sectors of the Indian 
economy—the striking examples being tele­
communications and information technology. At 
the same time, socioeconomic parameters—such as 
diversifying diets and growing urban incomes—that 
provide the enabling conditions for such growth 
were likely already present in the 1990s. Why then 
did large-scale food retailing, barring a few cases, 
not emerge?
The answer to this paradox lies in a combination of 
factors. On the one hand are issues relating to the 
policy environment; on the other hand are 
demand-side issues.
One factor driving retail market development has 
been the flow of foreign direct investment into 
developing countries.9 When retail markets in 
developed countries reach saturation, large-scale 
retailers in these countries begin to look at other 
markets to invest and operate in. In several 
developing countries, the opening up of economies 
to FDI spawned investment in food retailing. In 
Latin America, for instance, the food retail sector is 
increasingly and overwhelmingly operated by 
multinationals, and 70-80 percent of the top five 
chains are multinationals. In most cases, a handful 
of multinationals like Ahold, Carrefour, and Wal- 
Mart and smaller chains such as Casino and Metro 
Makro have dominated this transformation within 
countries [Reardon and Berdegue 2002], Regional 
multinationals such as Dairy Farm International 
[Hong Kong] and Shoprite [South Africa] have 
played this role too. Where FDI has not been 
directly involved, it has nevertheless influenced the 
transformation through participation in joint 
ventures; in China, for instance, Lianhua [the 
Shanghai-based retailer] partnered with Carrefour.
9 FDI refers to long-term investment in an enterprise by 
a firm in an economy other than the one in which it is 
based. It typically comprises a parent enterprise and the 
affiliate in the recipient country, with control resting 
with the former.
In the case of India, FDI has been disallowed in the 
retail sector and continues to be prohibited. The 
government has repeatedly staved off pressure 
from different quarters to change this policy.
India has allowed foreign participation only in 
wholesale cash and carry operations, single-brand 
retailing, franchising and joint ventures, and 
licensing arrangements. In 2006 the Indian gov­
ernment permitted only up to 51 percent foreign 
investment in single-brand retailing. Owing to this 
policy framework, multinationals could engage in 
only a limited way. Thus, FDI restrictions largely 
explain the absence of large foreign retailers in 
India.
Although FDI restrictions are a valid explanation, it 
has been argued that this cannot be an adequate 
explanation for the absence of large retailers per se, 
because India does not lack domestic capital. Yet 
throughout much of the 1990s, there were few 
large-scale investments in the retail sector. Some 
retailers grew steadily and successfully served a 
niche market in urban centers, such as Food 
World. One of the pioneers in supermarket-style 
food retailing in India, Food World was started in 
1996 by the RPG Group, later collaborating with 
Dairy International of the Jardine Matheson Group. 
Food World was one of the first retail players in 
India to introduce "modern" inventory manage­
ment systems and develop its own private label. 
Similar ventures were mostly confined to the 
southern states. For much of the 1990s, there were 
only a handful of such retailers. Until about 2 0 0 0 -  
2001, Chennai had five organized food and grocery 
retail chains, whereas other big cities such as 
Bangalore, Delhi, and Mumbai averaged only two to 
three such chains [Anand and Nambiar n.d.].
Several Indian corporate houses had been eyeing 
the food retail trade, but they perceived that the 
policy environment, among other things, was not 
entirely conducive.10 For instance, industry sources 
often cited urban real estate laws as a constraint on 
operations; the Urban Land Ceiling Act limits the 
physical space available to businesses. Industries also 
claimed that the many taxes and octroi levied on 
organized retailing complicated operations.
10 The following is typical of the sentiment among retail 
industry observers: "New retailing formats such as mass 
merchandising, hypermarkets, and warehouse clubs have 
not yet happened because of rules that prevent the 
development of organized retailing" [Busin essiine 2002).
The other aspect of policy that has confined large 
businesses is in the area of procurement and 
agroprocessing. Here, potential investors had to 
contend with several issues. Corporate involvement 
in agricultural production and trade has 
traditionally been severely curtailed in India. As in 
retailing, FDI was disallowed, except in tea 
plantations. The highly fragmented supply chain, 
coupled with the lack of high-quality infrastructure, 
meant that food retailing posed an extraordinary 
logistical challenge. Of those early entrants that 
took up food retailing in the 1990s, some exited 
soon after, ostensibly because of logistical 
problems [Nanz, for example, closed down in 
1999]."
There was also a perception that demand was not 
large enough to support the scaling up of opera­
tions—something that is critical given thin margins 
on groceries. Although urban incomes, especially 
among the middle class, were rising and consump­
tion patterns changing, the trend had only just 
begun and had yet to gather momentum. Further­
more, given strong and resilient regional 
preferences for consumption baskets, the con­
sumers themselves were too heterogeneous to be 
served by large supermarkets. In fact, large-scale 
retailers that recently entered the market 
acknowledge this heterogeneity: "The product 
offering in two stores 12 kilometers away is totally 
different" [A. T. Kearney 2005, 4], For this reason 
many of the supermarket-style ventures have con­
fined themselves to a particular region within India, 
even particular cities. For example, the RPG 
Group's Food World, Nilgiris, Margin Free, Giant, 
Varkey's, and Subhiksha all operate in southern 
cities; Sabka Bazaar operates in the capital region of 
Delhi; Haiko and Radhakrishna Foodland are 
Mumbai-centric; and Adani has been Ahmedabad- 
based [Anand and Nambiar n.d.).
The Beginnings of a Revolution
Despite the early languor of retail transformation, 
much of this has changed, especially since 2001. It 
seems that the Indian retail sector has taken flight.
On the demand side, there is no denying that most 
of the socioeconomic parameters that drive the 
growth of organized retail food marketing are
1 Nanz was promoted by the Delhi-based Escorts Group, 
the U.S.-based Marsh Supermarkets, and Nanz A G  of 
Germany.
present in India today more than ever before. The 
average Indian household spends around half of 
total household income on food. Diets have 
diversified considerably in favor of new foods, 
including other cuisines. There is broad agreement 
that since liberalization and economic reforms in 
1991, a marked shift has taken place in the mindset 
of the Indian consumer from need-based shopping 
to lifestyle shopping. Twenty-four percent of 
India's population falls in the 20- to 34-year-old 
age group [A. T. Kearney 2005] and seems to 
spend more freely than the previous generation 
did. High incomes fueled by tertiary sector growth 
have also created a new professional middle class 
that has begun to find intrinsic value in shopping 
experiences and consumer choice. This attitude 
permeates all areas, including food. This class has 
greater mobility and more contact with other 
countries and cultures, so that urban upper-class 
consumers look more like one another than before, 
blurring sociocultural boundaries. Urban lifestyles 
have changed perceptibly, and the growth in urban 
consumerism and a new "way of life" translates 
directly into huge potential demand for branded, 
packaged, and ready-to-eat foods. At the same 
time, there is rising concern about food safety 
among these classes, raising demand for foods and 
beverages that are hygienic, safe, and trustworthy. 
The growth of the bottled water industry in India, 
for instance, is testimony to this fact.
Mainly on account of these trends, the food retail 
sector in India today is worth about US$200 
billion. Given that organized retail has been regis­
tering growth rates of approximately 40 percent a 
year over the past three years, it is expected to 
grow to US$460~470 billion by 2010 [CII and 
McKinsey and Company 1997],
Simultaneously, there has been a reorientation of 
government policy. This has its roots in the 
economy-wide reforms that began in 1991. Over the 
decade since, there has been a gradual change in 
policy in favor of greater private sector participa­
tion in different sectors. Recent policy changes for 
food processing have spawned the growth of that 
industry, both for export and for the domestic 
market. Policy changes have also provided some 
enabling conditions for retailers in terms of logis­
tics and supply chain management [see Box 1 for 
examples].
Box 1: Recent Policy Initiatives in the
Food-Processing Industry
• Most processed food items were exempted from 
licensing under the Industries [Development and 
Regulation] Act, 1951, except items reserved for 
the small-scale sector and alcoholic beverages.
• Food-processing industries were included in the 
list of priority sectors for bank lending in 1999.
• Automatic approval for foreign equity up to 100 
percent is available for most processed food 
items except alcohol, beer, and those reserved 
for the small-scale sector, subject to certain con­
ditions.
• The excise duty on processed fruits and vegeta­
bles was lowered from 16 percent to 0 percent in 
the 2001-2002 budget.
• Licensing powers were delegated to regional 
offices under the Fruit Products Order, 1955.
Budget of 2004-2005
• Under the Income Tax Act, the government 
allowed a deduction of 100 percent of profits for 
five years and 25 percent of profits for the next 
five years for new agroprocessing industries set 
up to process, preserve, and package fruits and 
vegetables.
• The excise duty of 16 percent on dairy machinery 
was reduced to zero to help promote the dairy­
processing industry. The excise duty on meat, 
poultry, and fish was reduced from 16 percent to 
8 percent.
Budget of 2005-2006
• The customs duty on refrigerated vans was 
reduced from 20 percent to 10 percent.
Source: Ministry of Food Processing Industries 2 0 0 6 .
Domestic firms have started responding strongly to 
this latent demand, helped along by a more con­
ducive policy environment. The star entrant has 
been Reliance, a leading Indian conglomerate with 
no prior agribusiness experience, which announced 
that it would invest US$3.4 billion to become the 
country's largest modern retailer by establishing a 
chain of 1,575 stores by March 2007. Hypercity 
Retail, a subsidiary of K Raheja Corp Group, plans
to open 55 hypermarkets by 2015, and Bharati is 
set to follow with similar plans. Besides these exam­
ples of recent ventures and corporate expansion 
plans, several other enterprises have expressed 
similar ambitions, pointing to the immensity of the 
transformation currently underway.
Meanwhile, foreign investors are exploring ways to 
overcome policy obstacles to operating in India. 
Wal-Mart is considering opening a Sam's Club 
wholesale business through a joint venture and 
selling strictly to other retailers. This strategy skirts 
the issue of not being able to sell directly to 
consumers and establishes a presence in the local 
market. Tesco is planning to enter the market 
through a partnership with Home Care Retail Mart 
Pvt. Ltd. and expects to open 50 stores by 2010.
Organized food retailing is still in its infancy.12 For 
instance, food retailers in India today are quite 
different from their counterparts in the developed 
world. Indian retailers have extremely high average 
SKUs for fruits and vegetables relative to their 
western counterparts, mainly on account of their 
heterogeneous clientele with particular cultural and 
regional preferences. Store areas are not particu­
larly large—anywhere between 2,000 and 10,000 
square feet. Arrangements for sourcing vary across 
actors. Some retailers choose to buy from the 
wholesale market, whereas others have dedicated 
suppliers, small and large. Investments at the front 
end and in consumer interface, observers concur, 
have been tremendous. The extent of investment in 
the back end, in terms of on-farm handling, 
storage, and transport, has been lower. One excep­
tion is Metro, which made deep investments in 
building a high-quality supply chain to support its 
operations. Observers suggest that whereas some 
retailers have adopted a "big bang" approach and 
sought to maximize the number of new outlets and 
spatial reach, others have adopted a measured 
approach and focused on putting reliable supply 
chains in place. Metro, with only two stores in 
operation in over five years, is often cited as an 
example of the latter approach.
With the fledgling transformation in flux, a 
shakeup is inevitable and impending. How it unfolds 
is a matter of current interest. For instance, in 
some urban neighborhoods, where there was just 1
12 This entire section is based on information gathered 
from conversations with industry observers in Bangalore, 
Chennai, and Hyderabad during M arch-April 2 0 0 7 .
food retailer five years ago, now there are 10. In 
some of these outlets, turnover of merchandise has 
fallen by half in the face of competition; others are 
even losing money. Observers predict that in the 
near future, retailers will end up carving out niches 
for themselves within the food retail sector or will 
reposition themselves and consolidate. Only time 
will tell.
Stakeholders
So far, the discussion of the retail transformation in 
India's agro-food sector has been largely cele­
bratory, at least in the popular media. Yet this 
complex transformation is bound to have both 
winners and losers. Clearly, two issues merit careful 
scrutiny. First, how will the efficiency gains from 
this transformation be distributed among actors? 
Will it be equitable, or will the rents be cornered 
by those with greater economic power? Second, 
what kinds of costs will be associated with the dis­
placement of livelihoods that such a transformation 
will entail?
Policy makers dearly recognize the importance of 
these issues. In a speech in early 2005, Union 
Minister of Commerce and Industry Kamal Nath 
told a gathering of business leaders, "If any of you 
have come here to hear from me whether or not 
the Government is about to announce FDI in the 
retail sector, you are going to be disappointed.... 
The nature of the retail sector in India is too com­
plex for a hasty decision to be taken in this regard" 
(Nath 2005]. It is therefore imperative to examine 
the exact nature of potential gains and losses to the 
different stakeholders.
Indian corporate houses would stand to gain the 
most, especially given current FDI regulations. 
Recent years have seen a concerted effort by indus­
try groups such as Federation of Indian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry [FICCI] and the 
Confederation of Indian Industry [CII] to secure 
important changes in retailing policy. Their pitch to 
the government centers largely on efficiency gains 
from the technological changes brought about by 
large-scale retailers.
This approach could be a way to address the huge 
waste in Indian agriculture. Figures suggest that as 
much as 30 percent of produce is wasted annually, 
and only a fraction of agricultural produce is 
processed—as low as 2 percent for horticultural
crops [Ministry of Food Processing Industries 
2006].13 Investment in cold storage and processing 
by large-scale retailers would redress this situation 
and lead to huge efficiency gains. Industry groups 
also argue that retailing is a highly labor-intensive 
sector and would generate employment. Some also 
claim that larger retailers would bring in more tax 
revenue and conform to labor laws, because it is 
much easier to monitor and enforce these regula­
tions for large retailers than it is for the informal 
retail sector, which is diffuse and small in scale.
The supporting and ancillary sectors, such as 
processing, cold storage, and transport, constitute 
the other group of stakeholders. Large investments 
in these facilities, especially in the rural areas, would 
be welcome in the context of a weak rural 
industrial base if they generate employment.
As far as FDI policy goes, domestic industrial 
groups have been somewhat more divided. Some 
lobbying groups recognize that Indian industry 
would likely benefit from joint ventures with 
foreign counterparts, which would bring in new, 
state-of-the-art technology and larger investments. 
Industry observers suggest that Indian retailers 
have an advantage over foreign retailers because 
success in the retail trade in India has a significant 
component relating to home-ground advantage— 
that is, understanding the heterogeneity and 
particular characteristics of the Indian consumer— 
not to mention that Indian retailers have a head 
start. In fact, the swiftness with which Indian 
businesses are entering the retail sector suggests 
they recognize this! On the other hand, some fear 
that domestic firms might lose out to larger 
foreign retailers.14
This concern is universally true for another 
stakeholder group—small traders, who form a large 
constituency.15 As expected, they have been at the 
forefront of protests against large retailers with
13 The figure is higher for livestock produce.
14 For instance, Indian retail groups, such as the RPG 
Group and the Pantaloon Group, have expressed their 
strong opposition to allowing more FDI into Indian 
retailing, especially majority foreign ownership. They 
argue that the sector is still at an early stage of 
development and multinationals such as Wal-Mart would 
swamp local players, especially the kirana owners 
[.Business Standard200 5 ],
15 For an interesting discussion on the effect on existing
retailers, see Reardon and Hopkins [2006].
deep pockets. When Metro, the German cash-and- 
carry wholesaler, opened an outlet in Bangalore, the 
"Silicon Valley" of India, the joke went that it 
probably saw more protesters than customers. 
Whereas retail traders often have professional 
associations that enable some sort of collective 
action, itinerant vendors have little power or voice, 
let alone say, in matters of policy. They are diffuse 
and operate at a small level, and although they 
network with one another, they rarely have 
collective lobbying power.16
The nature of actors in the informal retail sector in 
India merits attention. It is often mentioned that 
the retail sector serves as a receptacle for the self- 
employed. A large section of this group has few 
employable skills and turns to retailing produce or 
groceries for lack of better opportunities. 
Although not true across the board, this is cer­
tainly true of itinerant vendors and street vendors. 
From this perspective, a supermarket that captures 
their clientele could simply dismantle their liveli­
hoods. As it is, this group has in the past suffered 
the consequences of city-level actions, such as 
forced evacuations.17 It is also difficult to imagine 
that they will be absorbed into the formal retail 
sector in any way, given their lack of marketable 
skills. There are supermarkets, however, that 
incorporate vendors. A retail format called store- 
within-store [adopted by Fabmall, for instance] 
accommodates existing vendors within the super­
market, providing them with not only store space, 
but also equipment like refrigerators. Similarly, 
Safal's chain of fruit and vegetable outlets in 
Bangalore serves as a supplier to vendors in the 
morning and an open shop to individual buyers 
during the day. These formats may aid rather than 
displace local vendors.
Consumers, another stakeholder group, are of 
course central to the discussion on retailing. They 
are often used prominently as mascots for the 
retail industry to tout consumer benefits such as 
greater choice, higher quality, and improved shop­
ping experiences. Moreover, the emergence of 
supermarkets, with their sophisticated supply 
chains, ensures safe products that conform, typi­
cally, to recognized grades and quality standards.
16 India does have a National Association of Street 
Vendors of India [NASVI] that has been active in this 
area.
17 A  National Policy of Urban Street Vendors was 
adopted in January 2 0 0 4  to address these issues.
This conformity is perhaps the hallmark of super­
market-style food retailing and is particularly 
important in India, where food-borne diseases and 
rampant adulteration by unscrupulous dealers are 
prevalent.
On the question of price, however, the benefits 
may not be as widespread. Consumers straddle the 
entire spectrum of socioeconomic classes in India 
and are therefore highly heterogeneous. It may well 
be that the ones who are most likely to benefit 
from supermarkets are the urban middle and 
upper-middle classes. This group has emerged from 
the post-liberalized India with the greatest spending 
power. The less visible, but certainly much larger, 
class of consumers consists of the poorer segment 
of the population. It is difficult to say how 
supermarkets will change things for them.
Only a few supermarkets in India have made claims 
of cheaper food. Specialized discount chains like 
Subhiksha, which focus on own-brand retailing of 
grains and pulses, are indeed much cheaper. Food 
World claims that its produce is 15 percent cheaper 
than alternative sources. Most other retailers, 
however, have focused on exploiting consumers' 
willingness to pay for convenience, choice, or a 
high-quality shopping experience.18 it is difficult to 
imagine these supermarkets catering to low-income 
groups. Over time, however, given the high 
contestability of retail markets, it is conceivable 
that supermarkets will indeed offer lower prices 
across the board.
In a country like India, this situation still leaves the 
issue of social access. Will supermarkets coexist 
with traditional food retail markets that will con­
tinue to serve the excluded segment? It is difficult 
to say. If, for instance, consumers patronizing the 
informal retailers are wooed into supermarkets, it 
would jeopardize the survival of the former. In that 
case, poorer consumers may be hurt by the 
coming of supermarkets.
l8Apna Bazar, which started with a middle-class iamge, 
recently repositioned itself as an upper-middle-class 
shopping venue, suggesting a shift to serving the upper 
end of the consumer spectrum. Even Subhiksha aims to  
be the principal store of purchase for at least 4 0  percent
of all consumers living within 5 0 0 - 7 5 0  meters of the 
store. This suggests a strategy that is targeting a 
subsection of the population and not all.
Retail power also raises important questions about 
the relative position of farmers, and "manufac­
turers" more generally, in the agro-food supply 
chain. Questions about the supply chain are espe­
cially relevant in the context of India, where the 
industrialization of agriculture is happening in 
tandem with the retail transformation, and these 
questions have attracted the most attention from 
researchers. Studies of the Indian case, however, are 
relatively scarce at present. Vertical linkages are 
sometimes beneficial to small, poor farmers, and at 
other times they are not. The effects of vertical 
linkages for small farmers seem to vary across 
crops and regions and with the exact nature of 
arrangements.
In India, procurement strategies cover the entire 
spectrum. At one end, for instance, is Bharti's Field 
Fresh, which contracts only with large farmers 
cultivating a minimum of 1,000 acres. Its executive 
explained, "I can manage ten or twenty farmers, 
but not thousands" [Witsoe 2006, 18], On the 
other hand, Choupal Fresh plans to source from 
small farmers with as little as one acre under 
cultivation. Others procure from wholesale markets 
as well as farmers. Systematic research would yield a 
clearer picture of this aspect of the agro-food 
industry.
Irrespective of whom retailers purchase from, these 
sources face one common problem: Strategic 
decisions at the retail end can have sudden and 
costly impacts on producers up the commodity 
chain. For instance, given that retail markets can be 
highly contested, retailers face pressure to keep 
procurement costs low.19 If the retailers are 
monopsonists at the farmer's end, they achieve this 
by driving down the price paid to the farmer. This 
issue is of course an empirical one, valid in some 
instances and not in others. In a country like India, 
however, with a huge population of small farmers, 
this risk to farmers must be an important 
consideration.
Although the coming of supermarkets clearly has 
both positive and negative ramifications, the issue is 
complicated by a woeful lack of data and research. 
In India, more than elsewhere, there is not much
,9Timmer [forthcoming] addresses the issue of 
contestability, pointing out that it is a key aspect. By 
extension, it is important to have contestability not only 
at the consumer end, but also at the procurement end.
clarity on how these developments will affect the 
different stakeholders, partly because the 
phenomenon is so recent.
Policy Options
For the government, this retail transformation 
presents a confounding problem. As control over 
the agro-food chain devolves to large-scale private 
sector players with deep pockets, several critical 
questions emerge at various levels.
On the one hand, the ongoing agrarian crisis and 
the erosion of rural livelihoods are pressing 
concerns. In that context, and given the enormous 
postharvest wastage, the emerging food retail 
scenario could solve some problems—'it could 
ensure postharvest efficiency in supply chain 
management and stable markets for farmers. It can 
also be an instrument for bringing about changes 
in cropping patterns, agronomic practices, pesticide 
use, and harvesting techniques, with important 
implications for farm incomes. Modern supply 
chains would also ensure traceability, and with 
monitoring, contribute to safe food that measures 
up to recognized quality standards. The retail 
sector would generate employment along the entire 
supply chain, including in intermediate sectors such 
as cold storage and transport. Needless to say, 
consumers would presumably benefit not only 
from having greater selection of produce and 
shopping experiences, but also from having access 
to high-quality produce.
At the same time, there are those who would 
almost surely be hurt—wholesale traders, retailers, 
itinerant vendors, and even poor consumers. As 
for farmers, it is not clear how much of the 
efficiency gains would in fact accrue to them. How 
can the government negotiate this?
At one level, the issue is to what degree the 
government should enable such a transformation. 
This issue relates to two sets of policies. First, 
should it press on and ultimately open up retailing 
to foreign investment? Second, disregarding FDI, 
should it reconfigure domestic policies, including 
those related to urban real estate and agricultural 
marketing, to allow businesses to link up and scale 
up operations?
At another level, how should the government 
address the livelihood issues of those who might be 
swept away by these changes? Should its policy be 
compensatory so that it helps them cope, or 
should it enable players in the informal retail sector 
or farmers to be part of this change?
A third critical question pertains to institutional 
diversity. Regardless of how inclusive this retail 
transformation may be, is the preservation of insti­
tutional diversity in agro-food marketing channels 
desirable for its own sake, as an end in itself? If so, 
what kinds of policy instruments can ensure that 
diversity is preserved?
Opening up FDI in retailing, many fear, is the thin 
end of the wedge. With it will come, inevitably, the 
tendency toward concentration. Historically, a 
period of mushrooming supermarket ventures first 
generates a highly contested market; in the second 
phase, there is a shake-up that promotes a trend 
toward consolidation in the sector. In Latin 
America the top five chains in each country 
control 65 percent of the supermarket sector, 
compared with 40 percent in the United States and 
72 percent in France [Reardon and Berdegue 2002], 
This consolidation can happen in two ways: Foreign 
chains can acquire local chains, or larger domestic 
chains can acquire smaller chains and independents. 
Alternatively, consolidation can occur through 
development of new outlets. Both processes have 
happened in Latin America. FDI is thus bound to 
amplify and hasten the process of consolidation, 
owing to the sheer amount of capital available to 
large multinationals. In the first eight months of 
2002, for example, five top global retailers spent 
US$120 million to build new stores in Thailand. 
During 2002 Wal-Mart spent US$660 million in 
Mexico [Reardon 2006], Multinationals have 
already begun acquiring Indian firms in the food­
processing industry,20 and this process could occur 
in food retailing as well, as a prelude to 
consolidation. On the other hand, it is clear that 
even in the absence of FDI, the retail revolution has
20 MTR, a family-owned concern, was bought out in 
2 0 0 6  by Norways Orkla for US$100 million, Nilgiris in 
Bangalore sold a majority stake to Actis for US$65 
million, and Barista was acquired by Lavazza of Italy for 
US$125 million. A t the same time, Indian enterprises were 
acquiring foreign brands: for example, Tata acquired 
Tetley for U S$430 million in 2 0 0 0 ,  Eight O 'clock  
coffee for US$220 million in 2 0 0 6 , and Energy Brands, 
Inc., for US$677 million in 2 0 0 6 .
well and truly begun and India's domestic firms are 
not particularly capital constrained. Opening up 
retailing to FDI would only accentuate the trend 
and not alter it in any significant way.
The next question pertains to the policy 
environment for domestic industry. Can the 
government incorporate this retail transformation, 
driven by the private sector, into its broader 
agenda of poverty alleviation and food security? If 
so, how?
The arguments straddle both positive and negative 
responses to this question. If supermarkets are to 
aid poverty alleviation rather than obstruct it, then 
they need to be inclusive of the poor—not only 
the poor farmer, but also the poor consumer and 
poor trader.
Few would disagree that many informal sector food 
retailers need better livelihoods and that it is desir­
able to enable them to achieve this goal, if neces­
sary by helping them exit this sector. Whether 
supermarkets can do this in a positive way, how­
ever, is the critical question. If supermarkets do in 
fact crowd out the vendors, these people are 
unlikely to be absorbed into the sector as 
employees. A recent entrant to food retailing, 
Reliance, announced that its strategy is to employ 
students and housewives in addition to hiring 
employees from other retailers. On the other hand, 
firms such as Food World have specifically trained 
youth from economically weaker segments of the 
population as staff. In terms of aggregate employ­
ment effects, studies suggest that the traditional 
retail channels are far more labor intensive than the 
formal retail sector. A study of retail food channels 
in Vietnam found that every metric ton of vege­
tables sold accounted for three times as much 
employment for street vendors as for supermarket 
staff [Asian Development Bank 2004], If this is true 
in India, it makes a strong case for supporting the 
informal retail sector, improving the condition of 
informal actors, and indeed maintaining the institu­
tional diversity of the food retailing sector.
Experience in Latin America suggests that small 
traditional stores and plaza markets have been 
losers. In the six largest countries of South 
America, there was a marked shrinkage in plaza 
markets in the 1990s: 64,198 small shops went out 
of business in Argentina between 1984 and 1993, 
and 5,420 in Chile between 1991 and 1995. The
exceptions were fruit and vegetable specialty shops 
[Reardon and Berdegue 2002). One cannot assume 
that smaller traders will be able to make the neces­
sary investments to be able to compete with large- 
scale retailers. On the other hand, they do not 
always fail. Farina et al. [2004), for instance, docu­
ment that in Brazil the number of traditional 
retailers and independent supermarkets increased 
by 33 percent and 7 percent, respectively, between 
1994 and 2002, whereas the number of chain retail 
stores declined by 21 percent. In India, industry 
observers point out that informal food retailers are 
very resilient and may have risen to the challenge. 
Some informal retailers have upgraded their store­
fronts, improved in-store displays and customer 
service, and adopted more sophisticated stock 
management and billing procedures. These changes 
show that traditional retailers can adapt, and even 
thrive, against the odds.
As for consumers, supermarkets in India have 
focused exclusively on niche markets in urban areas 
catering to the upper middle class. There is some 
evidence that poor consumers in developing 
countries, including Vietnam, rarely have access to 
supermarkets owing to distance as well as higher 
prices. In other countries, however, supermarkets 
tend over time to cater to poorer sections and 
serve non-urban centers, often by developing 
satellite chains with different formats [such as 
Shoprite in Zambia). About 40 percent of Chile's 
smaller towns now have supermarkets, as do many 
small to medium-sized towns even in low-income 
countries such as Kenya. In China, supermarkets 
are now spreading beyond the top 60 cities. The 
fact remains, however, that as long as there is a 
large segment of extremely poor people, 
supermarkets will find it a challenge to reach out to 
them. In this context, will the retail channels, public 
and private, that already serve them survive and 
continue to do so?
Finally, what about small farmers? To what extent 
do supermarkets procure from local producers as 
opposed to importing from other countries? Also, 
to what extent are small and marginal farmers 
included in the supply chains of the retail food 
sector?
The evidence on domestic and small farmer 
participation in the supermarket-driven food chains 
is mixed. Reardon and Berdegue [2002) estimated 
that supermarkets in Latin America buy 2.5 times
more fruits and vegetables from local producers 
than all the exports of produce from Latin America 
to the rest of the world. On the other hand, 
Shoprite Checkers in Zambia has been criticized for 
sourcing supplies through its parent company in 
South Africa rather than from Zambian producers 
[Mpundu 2005). In general, evidence suggests a 
range of procurement systems, from total reliance 
on traditional wholesalers delivering to individual 
stores (for small chains), to outsourced,
decentralized procurement systems (for small to 
medium-sized chains], to procurement from large- 
scale, specialized wholesalers or processors 
(Berdegue et al. 2005). Some studies find that 
supermarkets tend to source from large-scale 
processors in order to reduce transaction costs, 
because those processors possess adequate logistics 
and transportation capacity and are able to meet 
the private standards of the retailer. For example, 
the Xiaobaiyang chain in Beijing is known to have 
shifted from 1,000 to 300 processed food 
suppliers in two years as it centralized its 
procurement system (Hu et al. 2004). Similarly, 
leading Russian chains focus only on a handful of 
foreign and domestic suppliers for dairy products 
(Dries and Reardon 2005). Some other studies 
show substantial involvement of small growers 
(such as for tomatoes in Nicaragua and Guatemala 
and lettuce in Guatemala). Nonetheless, small 
farmers who do not have the capital to meet the 
requirements of supermarkets tend to be excluded, 
as illustrated in studies of potatoes in Ecuador 
(Zamora 2004) and vegetable producers in Thailand 
(Boselie 2002).
Also, the net benefit to the farmer of selling to 
supermarkets rather than to traditional markets is 
not always higher. For Guatemalan tomato farmers, 
Hernandez et al. (2004) show that there is not 
much difference in net return between selling to 
wholesalers that sell to supermarkets and selling to 
wholesalers that sell to traditional retailers. There is 
a perception, however, that the market risk is lower 
when a farmer enters a relationship with a 
wholesaler dedicated to the upper-tier market, such 
as supermarkets. For growers to enter these 
markets, it appears that farmers' associations or 
cooperatives tend to be necessary to reduce 
transaction costs, but these do not guarantee 
market access.
Conversations with farmers in southern India sug­
gest diverse outcomes. In some areas farmers are
immensely pleased with the advent of retail food 
buyers, who pay them competitive prices and have 
had a disciplining effect on the commission agents 
and wholesalers. In other places farmers are disen­
chanted with these buyers for reneging on oral 
commitments to buy and forcing prices down. 
What is certain, however, is that supply chain issues 
are critical in a country where smallholders 
predominate. Given this mixed evidence, it is 
difficult to draw up a prognosis for the small 
farmer in India.
Although the empirical evidence clearly offers 
several lessons and insights, the government walks a 
tightrope and must weigh the potential benefits of 
such transformation against its possible negative 
consequences—and find a way to make super­
markets a part of the change it seeks to bring. As 
more research on these various aspects of agro­
food retailing filter in, the situation should become 
clearer. No wonder then that the minister in his 
2005 speech to business groups appealed for 
caution in policy making, and against haste.
Assignment
Your assignment is to recommend to the Govern­
ment of India a set of policies to be pursued to 
guide future developments in the food retail sector, 
taking into account the interests of the different 
stakeholder groups.
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